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The ability to sense and avoid harmful environmental conditions is necessary for the
survival of all living organisms. Survival is also aided by an ability to codify and* learn from
past experience. Humans have an additional capability that allows them to alter their
environment as well as respond to it. This capacity both creates and reduces risk.
In recent decades, the profound development of chemical and nuclear technologies has
been accompanied by the potential to cause catastrophic and long-lasting damage to the earth and
the life forms that inhabit it. The mechanisms underlying these complex technologies are
unfamiliar and incomprehensible to most citizens. Their most harmful consequences are rare
and often delayed, hence difficult to assess by statistical analysis and not well suited to
management by trial and error learning. The elusive and hard to manage qualities of today's
hazards have forced the creation of a new intellectual discipline called risk assessment, designed
to aid in identifying, characterizing, and quantifying risk (Ricci, Sagan, & Whipple, 1984).
Whereas technologically sophisticated analysts employ risk assessment to evaluate
hazards, the majority of citizens rely on intuitive risk judgments, typically called "risk
perceptions." For these people, experience with hazards tends to come from the news media,
which rather thoroughly document mishaps and threats occurring throughout the world. The
dominant perception for most Americans (and one that contrasts sharply with the views of
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professional risk assessors) is that they face more risk today than in the past and that future risks
will be even greater than today's (Harris, 1980). Similar views appear to be held by citizens
of many other industrialized nations. These perceptions and the opposition to technology that
accompanies them have puzzled and frustrated industrialists and regulators and have led
numerous observers to argue that the American public's apparent pursuit of a "zero-risk society"
threatens the nation's political and economic stability.
Over the past 15 years, a small number of researchers have been examining the opinions
that people express when they are asked, in a variety of ways, to evaluate hazardous activities,
substances, and technologies. This research has attempted to develop techniques for assessing
the complex and subtle opinions that people have about risk. With these techniques, researchers
have sought to discover what people mean when they say that something is (or is not) "risky,"
and to determine what factors underlie those perceptions. The basic assumption underlying these
efforts is that those who promote and regulate health and safety need to understand the ways in
which people think about and respond to risk.
This research attempts to aid policy makers by improving communication between them
and the lay public, by directing educational efforts, and by predicting public responses to new
technologies (e.g., genetic engineering), events (e.g., a good safety record, an accident), and
new risk management strategies (e.g., warning labels, regulations, substitute products).
Risk Perception Research
Important contributions to our current understanding of risk perception have come from
geography, sociology, political science, anthropology, and psychology. Geographical research
focused originally on understanding human behavior in the face of natural hazards, but it has
since broadened to include technological hazards as well (Burton, Kates, & White, 1978).
Sociological research (Freudenburg, 1988; Short, 1984) and anthropological studies (Douglas,
1966) have shown that perception and acceptance of risk have their roots in social and cultural
factors. Short (1984) argues that response to hazards is mediated by social influences
transmitted by friends, family, fellow workers, and respected public officials. In many cases,
risk perceptions may form afterwards, as part of the ex post facto rationale for one's own
behavior. In a similar vein, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) assert that people, acting within
social groups, downplay certain risks and emphasize others as a means of maintaining and
controlling the group.
Psychological research on risk perception, which is the focus of this chapter, originated
in empirical studies of probability assessment, utility assessment, and decision-makingprocesses
(Edwards, 1961). A major development in this area has been the discovery of a set of mental
strategies, or heuristics, that people employ in order to make sense out of an uncertain world
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Although these rules are valid in some circumstances,
in others they lead to large and persistent biases with serious implications for risk assessment.
In particular, laboratory research on basic perceptions and cognitions has shown that difficulties
in understanding probabilistic processes, biased media coverage, misleading personal
experiences, and the anxieties generated by life's gambles cause uncertainty to be denied, risks
to be misjudged (sometimesoverestimated arid sometimesunderestimated), and judgments of fact
to be held with unwarranted confidence. Unfortunately, experts' judgments appear to be prone
to many of the same biases as those of laypersons, particularly when experts are forced to go
beyond the limits of available data and rely upon their intuitions (Henrion & Fischhoff, 1986;
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Research further indicates that disagreements about risk
should not be expected to evaporate in the presence of evidence. Strong initial views are
resistant to change because they influence the way that subsequent information is interpreted.
New evidence appears reliable and informative if it is consistent with one's initial beliefs;
contrary evidence tends to be dismissed as unreliable, erroneous, or unrepresentative (Nisbett
& Ross, 1980). When people lack strong prior opinions, the opposite situation exists—they are
at the mercy of the problem formulation. Presenting the same informationabout risk in different
ways (for example, mortality rates as opposed to survival rates) alters their perspectives and
their actions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
The Psychometric Paradigm
One broad strategy for studying perceived risk is to develop a taxonomy for hazards that
can be used to understand and predict responses to their risks. A taxonomic scheme might
explain, for example, people's extreme aversion to some hazards, their indifference to others,
and the discrepancies between these reactions and experts' opinions. The most common
approach to this goal has employed thepsychometric paradigm (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein,
Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1984), which uses psychophysical
scaling and multivariate analysis techniques to produce quantitative representations of risk
attitudes and perceptions. Within the psychometric paradigm, people make quantitative
judgments about the current and desired riskiness of diverse hazards and the desired level of
regulation of each. These judgments are then related to judgments about other properties, such
as (i) the hazard's status on characteristics that have been hypothesized to account for risk
perceptionsand attitudes (for example, voluntariness, dread, knowledge, controllability), (ii) the
benefits that each hazard provides to society, (iii) the number of deaths caused by the hazard in
an average year, (iv) the number of deaths caused by the hazard in a disastrous year, and (v)
the seriousness of each death from a particular hazard relative to a death due to other causes.
Numerous studies carried out within the psychometric paradigm have shown that
perceived risk is quantifiable and predictable. Psychometric techniques seem well suited for
identifying similarities and differences among groups with regard to risk perceptions and
attitudes (see Table 9.1). They have also shown that the concept "risk" means different things
to different people. When experts judge risk, their responses conelate highly with technical
estimates of annual fatalities. Lay people can assess annual fatalities if they are asked to (and
produce estimates somewhat like the technical estimates). However, their judgments of "risk"
are related more to other hazard characteristics (for example, catastrophic potential, threat to
future generations) and, as a result, tend to differ from their own (and experts') estimates of
annual fatalities.
Insert Table 9.1 about here
Another consistent result from psychometric studies is that people tend to view current
risk levels as unacceptably high for mostactivities. The gap betweenperceived and desired risk
levels suggests that people are not satisfied with the way that market and other regulatory
mechanisms have balanced risks and benefits. Across the domain of hazards, there seems to be
littlesystematic relationship between perceptions of current risks andbenefits. However, studies
of expressed preferences do seem to support Stan's claim (1969) that people are willing to
tolerate higher risks from activities seen as highly beneficial. But, whereas Stan concluded that
voluntariness of exposure was the key mediator of risk acceptance, further studies have shown
that other (perceived) characteristics such as familiarity, control, catastrophic potential, equity,
and level of knowledge also seem to influence therelationship between perceived risk, perceived
benefit, and risk acceptance (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980).
Various models have been advanced to represent the relationships between perceptions,
behavior, and these qualitative characteristics of hazards. As we shall see, the picture that
emerges from this work is both orderly and complex.
Factor-Analytic Representations
Psychometric studies have demonstrated that every hazard has a unique pattern of
qualities that appears to be related to its perceived risk. Figure 9.1 shows the mean profiles
across nine characteristic qualities of risk that emerged for nuclear power and medical x-rays
in an early study (Fischhoff et al., 1978). Nuclear power was judged to have much higher risk
than x-rays and to need much greater reduction in risk before it would become "safe enough."
As the figure illustrates, nuclear power also had a much more negative profile across the various
risk characteristics.
Insert Figure 9.1 about here
Many of the qualitative risk characteristics that make up a hazard's profile tend to be
highly conelated with each other, across a wide range of hazards. For example, hazards rated
as "voluntary" tend also to be rated as "controllable" and "well-known"; hazards that appeared
to threaten future generations tend also to be seen as having catastrophic potential, and so on.
Investigation of these intenelationships by means of factor analysis has indicated that thebroader
domain of characteristics can be condensed to a small set of higher-order characteristics or
factors. Figure9.2 presents a spatial representation of hazards within a factor space which has
been replicated across numerous groups of laypeople and experts judging large and diverse sets
of hazards. The factors in this space reflect the degree to which a risk is understood and the
degree to which it evokes a feeling of dread.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Research has shown that laypeople's risk perceptions and attitudes are closely related to
the position of a hazard within the factor space. Most important is the factor "Dread Risk."
The higher a hazard's score on this factor (i.e., the further to the right it appears in the space),
thehigher its perceived risk, the more people want to seeits cunent risks reduced, and the more
they want to seestrict regulation employed to achieve thedesired reduction in risk. In contrast,
experts' perceptions of risk are not closely related to any of the various risk characteristics or
factors derived from these characteristics. Instead, experts appear to see riskiness as
synonymous with expected annual mortality (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979). As a
result, many conflicts about risk may result from experts and laypeople having different
definitions of the concept. In such cases, expert recitations of risk statistics will do little to
change people's attitudes and perceptions.
The representation shown in Figure 9.2, while robust and informative, is by no means
a universal cognitive representation of the domain of hazards. Other psychometric methods
(such as multidimensional scaling analysis of hazard similarity judgments), applied to quite
different sets of hazards, produce different representations (Johnson & Tversky, 1984; Slovic,
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1984). The utility of these models for understanding and predicting
behavior remains to be determined.
Perceptions Have Impacts: The Social Amplification of Risk
Perceptions of risk play a key role in a process labeled social amplification of risk
(Chapter 10 this book; Kasperson et al., 1988). Social amplification is triggered by the
occunence of an adverse event, which could be a major or minor accident, a discovery of
pollution, an incident of sabotage, and so on. Risk amplification reflects the fact that the
adverse impacts of such an event sometimes extend far beyond thedirect damages to victims and
property and may result in massive indirect impacts such as litigation against a company or loss
of sales, increased regulation of an industry, and so on. In some cases, all companies within
an industry are affected, regardless of which company was responsible for the mishap. Thus,
the event can be thought of as a stone dropped in a pond. The ripples spread outward,
encompassing first the directly affected victims, then the responsible company or agency, and,
in the extreme, reaching other companies, agencies, or industries. Examples of events resulting
in extreme higher-order impacts include the chemical manufacturing accident at Bhopal, India,
the disastrous launch of the space shuttle Challenger, the nuclear-reactor accidents at Three Mile
Island and Chernobyl, the adverse effects of the drug Thalidomide, the Exxon Valdez oil spill,
and the adulteration of Tylenol capsules with cyanide. An important feature of social
amplification is that the direct impacts need not be too large to trigger major indirect impacts.
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The seven deaths due to the Tylenol tampering resulted in more than 125,000 stories in the print
media alone and inflicted losses of more than one billion dollars upon the Johnson & Johnson
Company, due to the damaged image of the product (Mitchell, 1989).
It appears likely that multiple mechanisms contribute to the social amplification of risk.
First, extensive media coverage of an event can contribute to heightened perceptions of risk and
amplified impacts (Burns et al., 1990). Second, a particular risk or risk event may enter into
the agenda of social groups, or what Mazur (1981) terms the partisans, within the community
or nation. The attack on the apple growth-regulator "Alar" by the Natural Resources Defense
Council demonstrates the important impacts that special-interest groups can trigger (Moore,
1989).
A third mechanism of amplification arises out of the interpretation of unfortunate events
as clues or signals regarding the magnitude of the risk and the adequacy of the risk-management
process (Burns et al., 1990; Slovic, 1987). The informativeness or signal potential of a mishap,
and thus its potential social impact, appears to be systematically related to the perceived
characteristics of the hazard. An accident that takes many lives may produce relatively little
social disturbance (beyond that caused to the victims' families and friends) if it occurs as part
of a familiar and well-understood system (e.g., a train wreck). However, a small accident in
an unfamiliar system (or oneperceived as poorly understood), such as a nuclear waste repository
or a recombinantDNA laboratory, may have immense social consequences if it is perceived as
a harbinger of future and possibly catastrophic mishaps.
The conceptof accidents as signals helps explain our society's strongresponse to mishaps
involving nuclear power and nuclear wastes. Because the risks associated with nuclear energy
are seen as poorly understood and catastrophic, accidents anywhere in the world may be seen
as omens of disaster everywhere there are nuclear reactors and wastes, thus producing responses
(e.g., increased regulation, public opposition) that carry large socioeconomic impacts.
Stigmatization
Substantial socioeconomic impacts may also result from the stigma associated with the
perception of environmental contamination or risk. The word stigma was used by the ancient
Greeks to refer to bodily marks or brands that were designed to signal infamy or disgrace—
to show, for example, that the bearer was a slave or a criminal. As used today, the word
denotes someone marked as deviant, flawed, limited, spoiled, or generally undesirable in the
view of some observer (Goffman, 1963). When the stigmatizing characteristic is observed, the
person is denigrated or avoided. Prime targets for stigmatization are members of minority
groups, the aged, homosexuals, drug addicts, alcoholics, and persons afflicted with physical
deformities or mental disabilities.
Jones et al. (1984) attempted to characterize the key dimensions of social stigma. The
six dimensions or factors they proposed were as follows:
(1) Concealability. Is the condition hidden or obvious? To what extent is its visibility
controllable?
(2) Course. What pattern of change over time is usually shown by the condition? What
is its ultimate outcome?
(3) Disruptiveness. Does the condition block or hamper interaction and communication?
(4) Aesthetic qualities. To what extent does the mark make the possessor repellent,
ugly, or upsetting?
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(5) Origin. Under what circumstances did the condition originate? Was anyone
responsible for it, and what was he or she trying to do?
(6) Peril. What kind of danger is posed by the mark and how imminent and serious is
it?
Dimension 6, peril, is the key link between stigma and perceived risk, but other dimen
sions may also come into play in the stigmatization associated with hazards. It seems evident
that stigmatizationcan be generalized from persons to products, technologies, and environments.
For example, nuclear and chemical waste disposal sites may be perceived as repellent, ugly, and
upsetting (Dimension 4) to the extent that they become visible (Dimension 1). Such waste sites
may also be perceived as disruptive (Dimension 3). They are certainly perceived as dangerous
(Dimension 6).
Stigmatization resulting from pollution by a toxic substance is described by Edelstein
(1986), who analyzed a case in which a dairy's cows become contaminated with PCBs for a
short period of time. Once this contamination became known (a visible mark) the reputation of
the dairy was discredited and its products became undesirable, even though the level of PCBs
was never sufficiently high to prohibit sale of those products. Edelstein showed, step by step,
how this incident meets the various criteria of stigmatization put forth by Jones et al.
Although Edelstein's case of stigma involved dairy products, only a short leap is required
to extend the concept to environments that have been contaminated by toxic substances
(Edelstein, 1988). Times Beach, Missouri, and Love Canal, New York, come quickly to mind.
A dramatic example of stigmatization involving radiation occuned in September 1987,
in Goiania, Brazil, where two men searching for scrap metal dismantled a cancer therapy device
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in an abandoned clinic. In doing so, they sawed open a capsule containing 28 grams of cesium
chloride. Children and workers nearby wereattracted to theglowing material and began playing
with it. Before the danger was realized, several hundred people becamecontaminated and four
persons eventually died from acute radiation poisoning. Publicity about the incident led to
stigmatization of the region and its residents (Petterson, 1988). Hotels in other parts of the
country refused to allow Goiania residents to register; airlinepilots refused to fly with Goiania
residents on board; automobiles driven by Goianians were stoned; hotel occupancy in the region
dropped 60% for six weeks following the incident and virtually all conventions were canceled
during this period. The sale prices of clothing and other products manufactured in Goiania
dropped by 40% after the first news reports and remained depressed for a period of 30-45 days,
despite the fact that none of these items was ever shown to have been contaminated.
Empirical Studies of Environmental Risk Perception and Stigma
In recent years we have applied the concepts of perceived risk, social amplification of
risk, and environmental stigma in an attempt to assess the potential economic impacts of the
proposed national repository for disposing of high-level nuclear wastes.
In December 1987, the U.S. Congress amended the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and
authorized the Department of Energy to determine whether Yucca Mountain, Nevada, is a
geologically sound and technically feasible site for disposal of high-level nuclear waste. If the
site passes a set of prescribed technical criteria, a repository will be constructed there to dispose
of nuclear waste from the nation's commercial power plants.
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Much effort has been, and will continue to be, devoted to characterizing the physical and
biological risks associated with construction and operation of this unique facility, which must
safely contain a large volume of highly radioactive material for a time period that is twice as
long as recorded human history. Socioeconomic risks, though less studied, are also important.
The remainder of this chapter describes a study in which my colleagues and I attempted to
answer the following question pertaining to social impacts: What is the potential for a high-level
nuclear waste repository at YuccaMountain to have adverse economiceffects on the city of Las
Vegas and the State of Nevada during the period of constructing and filling the repository
(approximately 40-60 years)?1
The economic impacts of concern to us included reduction in short-term visits to the city
and state by vacationers or conventioneers, effects on long-term residents (moving out of the
region, reduced in-migration of retirees), and reduced ability to attract new businesses.
Assessment of these impacts is obviously important to citizens and officials of Nevada, who need
to know what economic consequences to expect if Yucca Mountain is developed as the
repository. Information about possible economic impacts may also be relevant to the final
decision itself, regarding the acceptability of the Yucca Mountain site.
Empirical research on this topic faces some major obstacles, however. Changes in
scientific knowledge and changes in public opinion are inherently difficult to forecast. For
example, both scientific and public views about the risks of nuclear energy have changed
dramatically since the "Atoms for Peace" program began in the 1950's. An obstacle to survey
research is the fact that people may not really know how the repository will affect their future
1 Additional details of this research can be found in Slovic et al. (1991).
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preferences and decisions or the decisions of their successors. As a result, asking people to
project the repository's impacts on vacation decisions to be made many years hence may, in
effect, be asking them to "tell more than they can know" (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Studies by
Baker, Moss, West, and Weyant (1977) and West and Baker (1983) indicate that answers to
questions about the impact of nuclear facilities on future behavior may not be trustworthy.
Despite these difficulties, there are theoretical reasons, based upon perception of risk,
social amplification processes, and stigmatization, to expect that the repository may produce
adverse economic impacts. In our studies we developed a method for assessing impacts that is
not dependent on direct questioning of people. We then used this method to assess the potential
impacts from a repository at Yucca Mountain.
In order to avoid the problems of relying upon answers to hypothetical questions, our
studies employed an indirect strategy, based on the notion of environmental imagery. Studies
of environmental imagery appear to have the potential to provide a sound and defensible
theoretical framework from which to understand and project possible impacts of a nuclear-waste
repository on tourism and other important behaviors. Accordingly, the present studies were
designed to demonstrate the concept of environmental imagery and show how it can be
measured, assess the relationship between imagery and choice behavior, and describe economic
impacts that might occur as a result of altered images and choices.
The concept of imagery is not new to the study of environment and behavior.
Geographers, cognitive and environmental psychologists, marketing strategists, and consumer
theorists have written at length about the importance of images in our environmental
consciousness and our behavior (see, e.g., Boulding, 1956; Kearsley, 1985; Mclnnis & Price,
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1987; Paivio, 1979; Saarinen & Sell, 1980; Weart, 1988). However, to our knowledge, no one
has used a design such as ours to link imagery to the behaviors of concern here.
Our research was designed to test the following three propositions: (1) Images associated
with environments have diverse positive and negative affective meanings that influence
preferences (e.g., in this case, preferences for sites in which to vacation, retire, find a job, or
start a new business); (2) A nuclear-waste repository evokes a wide variety of strongly negative
images, consistent with extreme perceptions of risk and stigmatizatibn; and (3) The repository
at Yucca Mountain and the negative images it evokes will, over time, become increasingly
salient in the images of Nevada and of Las Vegas. If these three propositions are true, it seems
quite plausible that, as the imagery of Las Vegas and of Nevada becomes increasingly associated
with the repository, the attractiveness of these places to tourists, job seekers, retirees, and
business developers will decrease and their choices of Las Vegas and Nevada within sets of
competing sites will decrease.
Support for these three propositions, therefore, would demonstrate the mechanism
whereby the repository could produce adverse affects upon tourism, migration, and business
development in Nevada and this demonstration would occur without having to ask people to
make introspective judgments about their future behaviors.
Survey Design
In order to test the propositions described above, we first conducted three surveys of
imagery and preference. Studies 1 and 2 surveyed representative samples of residents in
Phoenix, Arizona. Study 1 elicited images for four cities and asked people to indicate their
preferences among these cities as places to vacation, take a new job, or retire. Study 2 did the
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same for four states. Study 3 surveyed a national sample of business executives, asking for their
images of each of four cities and their preferences among these cities as places to open a new
business or expand an existing business. All three surveys were conducted by telephone. Each
survey had a sample size of about 400 persons.
The survey questions in Studies 1 and 2 were nearly identical. The cities questionnaire
asked respondents to provide images for San Diego, Las Vegas, Denver, and Los Angeles. The
statesquestionnaire elicited imagery for California, Nevada, Colorado, and New Mexico. These
cities and states, in addition to Las Vegas and Nevada, were chosen for the study because they
are important vacation destinations for residents of Phoenix.
The images were elicited using a version of the method of continued associations (Szalay
& Deese, 1978), adapted for use in a telephone interview.2 Image elicitation was always the
first task in the survey. In the cities survey, the elicitation interview proceeded as follows:
"My first question involves word association. For example, when I mention the
word baseball, you might think of the World Series, Reggie Jackson,
summertime, or even hot dogs. Today, I am interested in the first SIX thoughts
or images that come to mind when you hear the name of a PLACE.
Think about for a minute. When you think about ,
[CITY] [CITY]
what is the first thought or image that comes to mind?
What is the next thought or image you have when I say ?
2 The studyof associations has a long history in psychology, going back to Galton (1880),
Wundt (1883), and Freud (1924). Szalay and Deese (1978) argue that word-association
techniques are easy and efficient ways of determining the contents and representational
systems of human minds without requiring those contents to be expressed in the full
discursive structure of human language. In fact, they argue, we may reveal ourselves
in associations in ways we find difficult to do if we were required to spell out the full
propositions behind these associations through answers to questions.
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[CITY]
. Your next thought or image?
[CITY]
What is another thought or image you have about
[CITY]
This continued until six associations were produced or the respondent drew a blank.
Then the procedure was repeated for the next city. The order of the cities was rotated across
respondents. The procedure was identical for the states and business location surveys.
Following the elicitation of images, respondents were asked to rate each image they gave
on a scale ranging from very positive (+2), somewhat positive (+1), neutral (0), somewhat
negative (-1), or very negative (-2).
Respondents in Studies 1 and 2 were then asked to rank the cities/states according to their
preference for a vacation site (long weekend vacation for cities; week or longer vacation for
states). Subsequent questions asked for a preference ranking among these cities or states as
retirement sites or places to move to assuming equally attractive job offers in each place, much
in the same manner as vacation preferences were elicited.
Next, up to six images were elicited to the stimulus "underground nuclear waste storage
facility" and the stimulus "nuclear test site."
The survey also asked "in which state has the federal government proposed to build an
underground facility for storing radioactive wastes?" and "in which state is the nuclear test site
located?"3
3 The nation's nuclear weapons test site is located in Nye County, Nevada, adjacent to the
proposed repository site at Yucca Mountain.
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The survey of corporate decision makers first elicited images for each of four
cities—Phoenix, Las Vegas, Denver, and Albuquerque—and then asked the respondents to
evaluate these images on the -2 to +2 rating scale, as in the other surveys. These individuals
were then asked to rank these cities in order of preference as a location for opening or
expanding a business, assuming that market conditions and cost conditions were about equal.
Results: Cities Survey
Images. In response to "Las Vegas," images associated with gambling, casinos, hotels,
bright lights and entertainment were dominant, followed by imagery pertaining to the climate
and physical landscape, money, crime, and immorality. Imagery related to nuclear waste and
the nuclear test site was very infrequent (only 2 images out of more than 1500 responses). Table
9.2 presents the hierarchy of images elicited by the phrase "underground nuclear waste storage
facility." This imagery was overwhelmingly negative. The most frequent associations by far
were dangerousness and death and their synonyms, followed by pollution, negative concepts, and
radiation. Although we did not ask people to score these images, it seems likely that most of
them would have been judged "very negative," a -2 on our five-point scale. Although some
images pertaining to "necessity" came at the 17th position, they were very few in number (17)
and included the phrase "necessary evil" given by two respondents. The words "Nevada" and
"Las Vegas" were weakly associated with the repository, which was not surprising, given the
low level of awareness of where the site is proposed to be located.4
4 Only 19.6% of the cities sample knew that Nevada had been selected as the leading
candidate for an underground facility for disposing of radioactive wastes and 46.8%
knew that the nuclear weapons test site is in Nevada.
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Insert Table 9.2 about here
Images of the nuclear test site were similarly negative and exhibited considerable overlap
in content with the images of a nuclear-waste storage facility. Major test-site images included
radiation, death, danger, cancer, destruction, and Nevada. More people associated Nevada with
the test site (82 mentions) than with the repository.
Predictingpreferencesfrom images. To predict preferences among cities from images,
we developed a scoring rule, the summation model, which simply sums the ratings for all the
images a respondent produced for each city. A person's preferences among cities are
hypothesized to be predictable from these sums.
An example, illustrating the application of the summation model to the data of one
respondent, is given in Table 9.3. For this respondent, the rank order of summation scores
exactly matched the preference order for vacation sites.
Insert Table 9.3 about here
When ranks generated by the summation model were compared to the actual ranks
generated by the respondents when they stated their preferences, the model did quite well,
conectly predicting 55% of the number 1 ranked vacation cities and 56% of the fourth ranked
cities, with somewhat less accuracy in predicting intermediate ranks (if the model lacked
predictive validity, we would expect a 25% hit rate by chance). The exact rank order of four
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cities generated by the summation model matched the exact rank order of the respondent 26.4%
of the time (perfect matching of ranks would be expected by chance only 4.2% of the time).
A second set of tests was conducted with the summation model. Each of the four cities
was paired with every other cities—making six pairs in all. For every respondent and every
pair, the image score for city B was subtracted from the image score of city A. The resulting
2,346 A-B scores across all respondents were ordered from extreme negative to extreme positive
and this distribution was partitioned into five subsets, as equal in size as possible (419 to 511
comparisons in each subset). Finally, within each subset, the percentage of respondents who
ranked city A more favorably than city B as a vacation site was calculated. For the pairs where
the mean A-B difference was most negative (mean = -6.2), A was prefened as a vacation site
for only 27.4%. For those in which the mean difference was most in favor of A (mean =
+ 11.4), 90.7% of the preferences favored A. Figure 9.3 illustrates the performance of the
summation model across all pairs of cities. The choice proportions for specific pairs of cities
(e.g., Las Vegas vs. Denver) were found to be quite similar to the combined plot. The data
show that imagery and preference for vacation cities are strongly related. If city B has a more
positive set of images than city A (as indicated by simply summing the affect ratings across
images produced for each city), then city B is more likely to be preferred as a vacation site. If
city A has more positive imagery, then city A is more likely to be prefened as a vacation site.
Insert Figure 9.3 about here
Predicting job and retirement preferences. The summation model was applied in similar
fashion to the prediction of job preferences and retirement preferences for the cities survey. The
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hit rates were similar to those reported earlier for vacation preferences and the functional
relationships relating job and retirement preferences to image scores were almost identical to the
relationship shown in Figure 9.3.
Results: States Survey
As in the cities survey, more people (41.0%) knew the location of the nuclear weapons
test site than knew the location being considered for the repository (24.5%). The summation
model was found to be about as accurate in predicting vacation, job, and retirement preferences
among states as it was for predicting preferences among cities.
Imagery associated with "a nuclear waste storage facility" and the "nuclear test site" was
extremely negative for respondents in the states survey and was almost identical to the imagery
obtained in the cities survey. Whereas few people in the cities survey expressed nuclear-related
imagery in response to Las Vegas, about 10% of respondents in the states survey produced
nuclear imagery in response to Nevada. Such images included the terms nuclear testing, nuclear
bomb, nukes, explosions, and radiation. The mean image score for Nevada for these persons
was 0.18. The mean image score for persons who did not associate Nevada with things nuclear
was 2.56 (a statistically significant difference; p < .001). As expected, persons with nuclear
imagery assigned lower (poorer) preference rankings to Nevada than did persons without such
images (see Table 9.4). These findings are important because they suggest that Nevada has
already undergone some stigmatization as a nuclear place.
Insert Table 9.4 about here
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Results: Corporate Decision Makers Survey
Parallel analyses were carried out with the images and preferences of the corporate
decision makers. The summation model conectly predicted 47% of the first-choice locations
for siting a new business and the functional relationship between image scores and preferences
for pairs of cities looked much like the relationship for vacation preferences in Figure 9.3.
In summary, three separate surveys totaling more than 1200 respondents demonstrated
that a simple summation model applied to sets of images did a good job of predicting expressed
preferences for cities and states in which to vacation, take a new job, retire, or site a business.
The slopes of the best-fitting lines relating preferences among pairs of cities/states to differences
in image values were quite steep, indicating that a change in one or two images could imply a
substantial shift in preference probability.
Effects of Repository Knowledge and Test-Site Knowledge
Additional analyses were conducted using the states survey data to determine the impact
of knowledge about the state being considered for the nuclear waste repository and knowledge
about the state in which the nuclear-test site is located upon images and preferences for Nevada
as a vacation site. These two types of knowledge were found to be related. Persons who knew
that the repository was being considered for Nevada were somewhat more likely to know that
the test site is in Nevada (71%) as compared to those who lacked knowledge of the repository
(55%). Similar results were obtained in the cities survey, where the conesponding values were
70% and 41%.
Additional analyses showed that the presence of a nuclear image in one's image set for
Nevada was determined more by knowledge of the test-site location than by knowledge of the
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repository location. Nuclear imagery was produced by 15% of those persons who knew the test-
site location compared to 2% of those who did not know the location. Conesponding figures
associated with knowledge and lack of knowledge of the proposed repository were 12% and 9%.
Summarizing the results from these analyses, we see that the proposed Yucca Mountain
repository has not yet infiltrated people's images of Nevada and has not yet had much effect on
) their stated vacation preferences. The test site, which has been a feature of Nevada for many
years, has had a stronger influenceon imagesand preferences. Knowledge that the weapons test
site is in Nevada appears to have led to an increase in nuclear-related imagery for Nevada and
nuclear imagery is associated with decreased preference for Nevada as a vacation site.
Imagery and Vacation Behavior
The previous analyses demonstrated that images could predict expressed preferences for
vacation sites. Can image scores also predict actual vacation trips? To address this question we
attempted to resurvey the 802 respondents from our 1988 Phoenix surveys some 16-18 months
later (October - December 1989). We were successful in re-interviewing about 130 persons in
each of the two samples (cities survey and states survey) studied earlier. Again, we elicited
word associations to each of the same four cities or four states and asked for positive/negative
ratings of each image produced. In addition, we asked the respondents to indicate in which of
these cities (or states) they had vacationed since the previous survey was conducted.
The predictive capability of the word-association image scores was tested by means of
logistic regression analysis using a person's 1988 image score for a state or city to estimate the
probability that that person would vacation in a placeduring the subsequent 16-18 months (until
the date of the repeat survey). The estimated probabilities for both cities and states are
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presented in Figures 9.4 and 9.5. These data show that the affective qualities of a person's
images of a place were clearly related to the probability that the person would subsequently
vacation there, with the relationship being stronger for states than for cities.
Insert Figures 9.4 and 9.5 about here
Discussion
The results of this study supported the three propositions that the research aimed to test:
Images of cities and states, derived from a word-association technique, exhibited positive and
negative affective meanings that were highly predictive of preferences for vacation sites, job and
retirement locations, and business sites (Proposition 1). The concept of a nuclear-waste storage
facility evoked extreme negative imagery (Proposition 2). The nuclear-weapons test site, which
has been around far longer than the Yucca Mountain nuclear-waste project, has led to a modest
amountof nuclearimagery becoming associated with the stateof Nevada. This providesindirect
evidence for Proposition 3, which asserts that nuclear-waste related images will also become
associated with Nevada and Las Vegas if the Yucca Mountain Project proceeds. Nuclear
imagery, when present in a person's associative responses, was found to be linked with much
lower preference for Nevada as a vacation site, the verification of these propositions implies
that the repository also has the potential to cause an increase in nuclear imagery which, in turn,
will produce adverse impacts on tourism and other economically important activities in Nevada.5
5 A parallel study by Easterling and Kurtreuther (1990) has found that repository imagery
reduces the attractiveness of Las Vegas for convention planners and convention attendees
and thus has the potential to affect the city's convention industry.
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These findings provide a partial answer to the question that motivated the inquiry. The
mechanisms of perceived risk, social amplification, and stigma are observable in the record of
past experience with nuclear and other types of hazards. In the context of the Yucca Mountain
Repository, these mechanisms appear to have the potential to cause substantial losses to each of
the various economic sectors at risk. It would be unwise and unfair for development of the
nation's high-level nuclear waste repository to proceed without taking these potential economic
impacts into consideration.
Although this research has clarified the mechanisms by which adverse economic impacts
can be generated, predicting the precise magnitude and duration of those impacts is impossible.
The uncertainties involved in repository development make it inevitable that the actual
impacts—physical, biological, social, and economic—-will differ from the best of impact
projections.
In sum, this analysis indicates that the development of the Yucca Mountain Repository
will, in effect, force Nevadans to gamble with their future economy. The nature of that gamble
cannot be specified precisely, but it appears to include credible possibilities (with unknown
probabilities) of substantial losses to the visitoreconomy, the migranteconomy, and the business
economy. Because of the uncertainty inherent in projecting these impacts, reasonable people
may differ greatly in their estimates. Actions may or may not appear warranted, based upon
assessment of these special impacts. But the important implication of this study is that the
possibility of such impacts cannot be ignored.
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Broader Implications
The research described in this chapter has implications for social-impact analysis that
transcend the conflicts and concerns sunounding the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. The
processes of social amplification and stigma appear relevant also to the analysis of impacts from
any major facility that produces, uses, transports, or disposes of hazardous materials. The
numerous proposed sites for disposal of low-level radioactive wastes and the many sites being
considered for chemical-waste incinerators and landfills will face similar problems of perceived
risk and its impacts, though probably to a lesser degree than the problems posed for Nevadans
by a Yucca Mountain repository. The study of socioeconomic impacts at Yucca Mountain has
demonstrated that the so-called "standard effects" of large engineering projects on local
employment, housing, and transportation have the potential to be dwarfed by the "special
effects" of risk perception and stigma. However, just as physical or technical risks can be
mitigated by proper safety design and management, effects of perceived risk may be mitigated
by means of management processes that instill and maintain trust and that work to protect the
economic base of those individuals and communities whom the project puts at risk.
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Table 9.1
Ordering of perceived risks for 30 activities and technologies. The ordering is based on the
geometric mean risk ratings within each group. Rank 1 represents the most rislcy activity or
technology. Source: Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1980).
League of Active
Women College Club
Activity or Technology Voters Students Members Experts
Nuclear power 1 1 8 20
Motor vehicles 2 5 3 1
Handguns 3 2 1 4
Smoking 4 3 4 2
Motorcycles 5 6 2 6
Alcoholic Beverages 6 7 5 3
General (private) aviation 7 15 11 12
Police work 8 8 7 17
Pesticides 9 4 15 8
Surgery 10 11 9 5
Fire fighting 11 10 6 18
Large construction 12 14 13 13
Hunting 13 18 10 23
Spray cans 14 13 23 26
Mountain climbing 15 22 12 29
Bicycles 16 24 14 15
Commercial aviation 17 16 18 16
Electric power (non-nuclear) 18 19 19 9
Swimming 19 30 17 10
Contraceptives 20 9 22 11
Skiing 21 25 16 30
X-rays 22 17 24 7
High school and college football 23 26 21 27
Railroads 24 23 20 19
Food preservatives 25 12 28 14
Food coloring 26 20 30 21
Power mowers 27 28 25 28
- Prescription antibiotics 28 21 26 24
Home appliances 29 27 27 22
Vaccinations 30 29 29 25
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Table 9.2
Hierarchy of images associated with an "underground nuclear waste storage facility." Source:
Slovic et al. (1991). •
Category Frequency Images Included in Category
1. Dangerous 179 dangerous, danger, hazardous, toxic,
unsafe, harmful, disaster
2. Death 107 death, sickness, dying, destruction
3. Negative 99 negative, wrong, bad, unpleasant, terrible,
gross, undesirable, awful, dislike, ugly,
horrible
4. Pollution 97 pollution, contamination, leakage, spills,
Love Canal
5. War 62 war, bombs, nuclear war, holocaust
6. Radiation 59 radiation, nuclear, radioactive, glowing
7. Scary 55 scary, frightening, concern, worried, fear,
honor
8. Somewhere Else 49 wouldn't want to live near one, not where I
live, far away as possible.
9. Unnecessary . 44 unnecessary, bad idea, waste of land
10. Problems 39 problems, trouble
11. Desert 37 desert, barren, desolate
12. Non-Nevada Locations 35 Utah, Arizona, Denver
13. Storage Location 32 caverns, underground salt mine
14. Government/Industry 23 government, politics, big business
-
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Table 9.3
Images, ratings, and summation scores for respondent 132. Source: Slovic et al. (1991).
Image Image
Sample Subject Number Rating
SAN DIEGO 1 2 very nice
SAN DIEGO •2 2 good beaches
SAN DIEGO 3 2 zoo
SAN DIEGO 4 1 busy freeway
SAN DIEGO 5 1 easy to find way
SAN DIEGO 6
Sum =
2
10
pretty town
LAS VEGAS 1 -2 rowdy town
LAS VEGAS 2 -1 busy town
LAS VEGAS 3 -1 casinos
LAS VEGAS 4 -1 bright lights
LAS VEGAS 5 -2 too much gambling
LAS VEGAS 6
Sum =
0
-7
out of the way
DENVER 1 2 high
DENVER 2 0 crowded
DENVER 3 2 cool
DENVER 4 1 pretty
DENVER 5 -2 busy airport
DENVER 6
Sum =
-2
1
busy streets
LOS ANGELES 1 -2 smoggy
LOS ANGELES 2 -2 crowded
LOS ANGELES 3 -2 dirty
LOS ANGELES 4 -1 foggy
LOS ANGELES 5 0 sunny
LOS ANGELES 6
Sum =
-2
-9
drug place
Note: Based on these summation scores, this person's predicted preference order for a vacation
site would be: San Diego, Las Vegas, Denver, and Los Angeles.
Table 9.4
Preference for Nevada as a vacation site among respondents who do and do not exhibit nuclear
imagery. Source: Slovic et al. (1991).
Nevada Preference Rank
1 4 Mean Rank
Nuclear Imagery Present 3 3 46 49
(N = 39)
3.41
Nuclear Imagery Absent 6 16 51 27 2.98
(N = 354)
Note: Cell entries are percentages within each row.
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Figure Captions
Figure 9.1. Profiles for nuclear power and x-rays across nine risk characteristics.
Source: Fischhoff et al. (1978).
Figure 9.2. Location of 81 hazards on Factors 1 and 2 derived from the
intenelationships among 15 risk characteristics. Each factor is made up of a combination of
characteristics, as indicated by the lower diagram. Source: Slovic (1987).
Figure 9.3. Proportion of times (P) City A was ranked higher than City B in the
respondent's preference rankings for vacation sites as a function of mean image score differences
(City A-City B). All possible pairs of cities are included in this analysis. Source: Slovic et al.
(1991).
Figure 9.4. Probability of vacationing in a particular city after June, 1988, as a function
of image scores elicited prior to that date (Phoenix survey). Upper row of numbers indicates
the number of people with that image score who vacationed in the city; lower row is the number
who did not vacation in the city; * marks the proportion who vacationed. The curve is the best-
fit logistic function to these proportions. Source: Slovic et al. (1991).
Figure 9.5. Probability of vacationing in a particular state after June, 1988 as a function
of image scores elicited prior to that date (Phoenix survey). Upper row of numbers indicates
the number of people with that image score who vacationed in the state; lower row is the
number who did not vacation in the state; * marks the proportion who vacationed. The curve
is the best-fit logistic function to these proportions. Source: Slovic et al. (1991).
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Index
Accidents as signals 9
Choice 14, 20
Expert judgment . 5, 7
Heuristics 3
Nuclear waste repository 9, 13, 22, 25
Preferences 5, 14-16, 19, 20, 22, 23
job 15, 20, 21, 24
retirement 15, 20, 21, 24
vacation 15, 17, 21-24
Risk . . 1
"zero-risk society" 2
Risk assessment .1,3
Risk perception 1-5, 7, 12, 26
empirical studies 3, 12
environmental imagery 14
factor-analytic representations 6
impacts 8-10, 12-14, 24-26
psychological research 2, 3
psychometric paradigm 4, 5
representations 4, 8
signals 9
surveys 15-18, 22, 23
Social amplification of risk 8, 9, 12
Socioeconomic impacts 10, 26
Stigmatization . 10-12, 14, 15, 21
criteria of stigmatization 11
Word associations 23
Yucca Mountain, Nevada 12-15, 23-26
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